Earthquake predictions are easy (NOT!)

October 30th, 2011

Hi Donna,

Jen Tucker was presumably referring to the difference between the type of earthquakes they tend have in Japan and the types we tend to have here.  The pro-nukers and otherwise mis-informed always focus on the differences, however slight, however irrelevant.

Fukushima was BWRs, ours are PWRs.. Makes all the difference, they say.  Fukushima was run by Japanese and what do THEY know about technology?  What do THEY know about earthquake prediction?  So many differences, they can always focus on one or a couple of them.  The Emergency Diesel Generators are built high up in one case, low in the other, and vice-versa for their fuel.  Our way is always better.   (Note that DCNPP and SONWGS store their dry casks differently:  One vertically, one horizontally, three high.  I wonder which is better, don’t you?!?!?!  The answer is neither is good enough.  But better storage is more expensive and in SanO’s case, they don’t have the land.   The Marines won’t give them more land because they need room for their ordinance.  Kind of a strange neighbor for a nuclear power plant, when you think about it — especially in the county where that guy stole a tank a while back…

Tucker is completely ignoring underwater land slides caused by relatively small EQs that can create huge tsunamis, and she’s also ignoring the fact that undiscovered EQ faults might run right under one or both of the reactors (like at DCNPP) for all we know.  (New faults are discovered regularly in California.)   And she’s also ignoring the fact that the known fault lines nearby have already been rated (by somebody who’s qualified to make such guesses, if not the scientists SanO hires) as probably capable of greater EQs than SONWGS is designed for.

And she’s completely ignoring the fact that rust may have weakened SanO so it can’t withstand what they say it can — or maybe it never could.  Lots of buildings in California have fallen due to lesser quakes than they were designed for, including buildings built long after SanO, when the engineers supposedly knew more about EQs than ever.  And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission thinks THEY are experts in everything: Earthquake faults in California, tsunami hazards, crane operations or anything Cal-OSHA or OSHA would normally cover, economics of wind-energy systems (how can you call something “safe” when there’s a REALLY safe alternative?)….. the list goes on.  The NRC usurps all other normal regulatory authority, in addition to doing a lousy job of regulating the “nuclear” aspects of the operation.

I’m convinced that one of the main reasons buildings continue to fail unexpectedly in EQs is because of resonance issues, and those are nearly impossible to predict, but their result is obvious:  Building fail “unexpectedly”.  The shaking wasn’t “that much” compared to what they were built to withstand but they fell anyway.  Why does that happen?   I expect that trend to continue.  When the earth rhythmically shakes several hundred thousand buildings at once for a minute or two, it seems likely to me that some of them are likely to vibrate at a very destructive resonating frequency.  In my opinion, it’s not just size that matters, or distance from the epicenter, or both.  It’s far more complicated than that.   The terrain for miles around can effect what one particular area feels in an EQ.

A consequence of whatever it is that makes EQ damage so hard to predict is that the descriptions of what might or might fall down at various levels of EQs are mere guesses, just as the possible strength, time, depth, direction, and resonance frequency of the NEXT big EQ to strike California is, likewise, impossible to predict.

We can hope that the nuke plants and nuke fuel dumps, and any bridges where nuke fuel is being transported at the time, are all immune to resonance frequency vibrations during EQs, and all other dangers beyond their design basis.  We can also believe in ghosts and goblins, too….

Yours,

Ace Hoffman
Carlsbad, CA

At 09:48 AM 10/30/2011 -0700, Donna G. wrote:

This YouTube video has a quote from Jen Tucker.  She said, with confidence, we can’t have an earthquake like Japan — giving the impression everything is just swell at San Onofre.  So I sent her the below email quoting the USGS on “Earthquake Myths”.

http://youtu.be/oHGDBPZjGvk

——– Original Message ——–
Subject: Earthquake predictibility
Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2011 09:38:18 -0700
From: Donna G.
To: Jen Tucker – San Clemente Emergency Planning Ofcr

Jen,
Have you see this USGS website link?  I’ve printed the text below.

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/faq/?faqID=13

FAQs – Earthquake Myths

Q: Can you predict earthquakes?

A: No. Neither the USGS nor Caltech nor any other scientists have ever predicted a major earthquake. They do not know how, and they do not expect to know how any time in the foreseeable future. However based on scientific data, probabilities can be calculated for potential future earthquakes. For example, scientists estimate that over the next 30 years the probability of a major EQ occurring in the San Francisco Bay area is 67% and 60% in Southern California.

The USGS focuses their efforts on the long-term mitigation of earthquake hazards by helping to improve the safety of structures, rather than by trying to accomplish short-term predictions.


====================================================


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Curiosity hasn’t killed this Rover, but it should!

Comment left at

http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/archives/2011/08/inside-curiosity-nasas-next-mars-rover.html

 

Those of us who have followed NASA’s use of plutonium-238 dioxide in prior space missions are terrified of this particular launch.  Why?  Bad engineering!  The containers for the plutonium are NOT designed to prevent the release of their deadly contents during certain critical and unavoidable phases of the flight: Late launch, for example, or a full-stack powered impact into the earth (something they have self-destruct mechanisms to avoid, but even self-destruct mechanisms have been known to fail at critical times).

There are many pathways to failure in this mission, failures which can result in massive poisonings of Florida or nearly anywhere else on the planet — or simply the whole planet.

The alternative, after reading the description of the problem with solar power in the article, appears to be simply to put dust-wipers on the solar panels.

Instead, the additional weight of this new rover demands a new method of landing on Mars — the old one was unreliable anyway.  (Bouncy Bouncy.) This one will be, too, one can be sure of that.  So all that plutonium might be launched for naught — hundreds of billions of lethal doses’ worth of one of the world’s most deadly poisons. (Pu-238 is nearly 300 times more toxic than normal “weapons grade” plutonium (Pu-239).  It’s half-life, about 87 years, is correspondingly shorter than Pu-239’s 24,000 year half-life.)

Thousands of people have already protested these dangerous nuclear launches.  NASA’s arrogance regarding its use of plutonium-238 for “civilian” purposes appears to be directly related to the U.S. government’s stated desire to launch plutonium and uranium-powered military rocketry for “domination” of outer space near earth.  So there are two very good reasons to oppose this launch, besides that it’s a waste of money.

The amount of space debris already in orbit guarantees that if nuclear payloads are launched, there will be catastrophic accidents and fall-backs to earth, possibly over highly-populated areas.  This one launch could cause a major city such as Tokyo or New York to have to be abandoned!  The containers are designed to release their payloads at high altitude in the event of an accident, but that doesn’t actually save a planet full of people because Pu follows a “Linear, No Threshold” health effects pattern, as far as we know (“we” being the National Academy of Sciences, for example).  So no matter where or how it comes down, it’s bound to poison a lot of people before it all decays.  And a significant portion of the Pu is, in fact, Pu-239 with its 24,000 year half-life.

This launch is anything but an engineering marvel and anyone truly curious about it will be aghast.  It’s a potential human disaster.  Thus it is already an engineering failure, and forcing this horrific risk on billions of unsuspecting humans (who are now breathing Fukushima’s effluent as well) is especially cruel.  There is no reason for NASA to do this.
—————————
The author’s prior comments on Cassini were published in Space News, The Washington Post and elsewhere.  He is a computer programmer and co-author of Statistics Explained, a computer program which teaches first-year statistics for scientists. He is also the author of All About Pumps and the Animated Periodic Table of the Elements, and a co-author of The Heart: The Engine of Life, all computer programs.  He has also authored a book about nuclear power: The Code Killers (2008).

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Comment regarding SanO’s spokesliar

Gil Alexander’s comments are beyond unreasonable — they are dangerous.  They show the extreme arrogance and apathy of the workers at the plant.  What he calls “way into the hypothetical” is precisely what happened in Fukushima — but it doesn’t really matter, because the real problem is much deeper — more unsolvable than merely SanO’s ability to replicate Fukushima’s tragedy to a “T” and in a heartbeat.  It’s that the fission products are building up at an incredible rate.  It’s that the zirconium cladding is a designed-for-failure system recognized as such long ago — at least as early as the 1970s — as one of the greatest “Achilles’ Heals” of an industry with nothing BUT Achilles’ Heals — one that was denied, hidden, and/or ignored until Fukushima exposed the truth and exposed us all to its thousands of trillions of lethal doses of radiation, spreading as we speak all over the world.  The short-lived isotopes from the initial bursts have decayed away, but the longer lived ones will be killing for generations to come, and more continues to be released, with even worse explosions possible at any moment.  Who wants that HERE?!? Waiting for the NRC to decide the plants are unsafe is ridiculous:  They should have shut San Onofre down before it opened if they were truly concerned about our safety!  For more information please visit my web site: http://www.acehoffman.org .  Nothing can destroy SoCal faster and more permanently than San Onofre, and its power can be easily replaced.

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From: http://sanjuancapistrano.patch.com/articles/nuke-regulators-to-hand-down-new-rules-for-san-onofre-soon-2

Nuke Regulators to Hand Down New Rules for San Onofre Soon

Officials at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station say it’s too early to know what new rules the NRC will apply to the plant as a result of its Japan Task Force. Some residents continue to fight for the plant’s shutdown.

  • By Adam Townsend

U.S. nuclear regulations don’t address what to do if the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station lost all power for as long as Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant did.

Though plant and government officials uniformly say that risk is minimal, it was one of the findings from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s preliminary look at the disaster at the Fukushima plant.

Caused by the March earthquake and tsunami, the disaster in Japan sparked a public outcry in San Clemente for the closure of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Southern California Edison officials at San Onofre say it’s too early to say what plant administrators will have to do in response to the recommendations from the NRC’s Japan Task Force, but agency officials said in hearings last week that they would put together a specific plan within three months.

SOME PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED

The Fukushima plant experienced extended “station blackout” when the 45-foot tsunami (27 feet higher than the plant was built to withstand) inundated the diesel generators that were supposed to keep instruments running.

“The operators were faced with a catastrophic, unprecedented emergency situation,” the initial report states. “They had to work in nearly total darkness with very limited instrumentation and control systems.”

(A complete copy of the Japan Task Force’s 90-day review accompanies this article in PDF form. In it is a full timeline of the events at the Fukushima Daiichi plant.)

One of the NRC Japan Task Force’s main findings was that “station blackout is not a design-basis event,” meaning the engineers and architects of nuclear plants in the U.S. weren’t required to envision a scenario in which the station could lose all power for an extended period.

Charles Miller, the head of the Japan Task Force, also reported to the NRC that, although “a similar sequence of events is unlikely to occur,” and “continued licensing and operations activities don’t pose a threat,” the current regulatory framework is a “patchwork” that needs an overhaul.

The recommendations from the committee include better preparations for extended station blackouts, a number of technical improvements to safety systems and continuing updates and retrofits according to the latest information about external hazards.

Southern California Edison is now in the process of getting California Public Utility Commission permission to conduct a seismic study on the Christianitos Fault found off the coast of San Onofre after the plant was built.

NRC: WATCHDOG OR LAPDOG?

These Japan Task Force recommendations come as various journalistic agencies such as the Associated Press and Pro Publica are questioning the efficacy of the NRC and the safety of U.S. nuke plants in general.

On Thursday, Pro Publica published an article quoting NRC whistleblowers who, in reports, “cited lapses by a parade of NRC inspectors … and systemic weaknesses.”

Furthermore, a scientist from anti-nuke group Friends of the Earth has heavily criticized the initial recommendations from the Japan Task Force. Friends of the Earth has connected with San Clemente Green and other local groups fighting for a San Onofre shutdown.

San Clemente Green founder Gary Headrick told the City Council this month that Friends of the Earth offered to fly in scientists for a Sept. 27 informational meeting—experts who may challenge the assessments of NRC and SoCal Edison officials at the public informational meeting scheduled for that date.

NUKE PLANT OFFICIALS TRY TO REASSURE PUBLIC

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station officials have been saying since the March disaster in Japan that important differences exist between the San Clemente Plant and Fukushima Daiichi.

Plant spokesman Gil Alexander said the first line of defense is simply sucking power from the existing grid. The plant is powered through power lines like any other business, and the power system.

If, as in Japan, the grid were severed, diesel generators would kick in—in San Onofre’s case, unlike at Fukushima, the generators are sealed in concrete bunkers, offering some protection against a possible tsunami.

“Each of the reactor systems has two diesel generators, either one of which can power all of the safety systems,” Alexander said. “The backup generators have backup generators.”

To back up those power supplies is an array of batteries “that are ready to go in the case of the unimaginable … we’re way into the hypothetical here,” he said.

Alexander said that even in the case of a prolonged disconnection from the power grid, the San Onofre plant could run indefinitely off diesel generators as long as fuel could be trucked in; there’s enough on site to run the safety systems for seven days.

In addition, a tsunami wall, the top of which is 30 feet above sea level, protects the plant, Alexander said.

Despite reassurances by plant officials, it’s likely the plant administrators and technicians will have to adapt to new regulations and protocol in the coming months.

“It’s too early to tell yet in the NRC review process exactly what recommendations will be adopted and how they will be applied at San Onofre,” Alexander said.

Related Topics: Friends of the Earth, Fukushima Dai-ichi, Japan Task Force, Reactor, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Southern California Edison, nrc, nuclear regulatory commission, san clemente, and san clemente green
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The “brave” Captain of K-19…

From: World Nuclear News, July 10th, 2011

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=30368

Captain of jinxed sub to swim Loch Ness
08 July 2011
A former commander of the K-19 nuclear submarine has decided to swim the width of Scotland’s Loch Ness as a way to mark the 50th anniversary of an accident aboard the Russian vessel. Captain Oleg Adamov, who led the first-generation nuclear submarine between 1997 and 2001, has arrived in Scotland for his attempt to swim the width of Loch Ness in record time. The 2.7 kilometre open water swim takes place on 10 July – 50 years after the K-19 suffered a loss of coolant accident and eight crew sacrificed their lives to fashion an ad-hoc cooling loop. The story of the accident was made into the 2002 Hollywood movie, ‘K-19: The Widowmaker’, starring Harrison Ford and Liam Neeson. The ship was launched in 1961 and, despite the nuclear accident, continued to be used by the Soviet navy until 1990. However, the K-19’s history was marred by further accidents, including a collision with a US sub and a fire that killed a total of 56 men. K-19 was eventually scrapped in 2003. The brave Captain will swim alongside former nuclear submariners from both Russia and the UK, while lifeboat crews will be on hand.
————————————————————
What more appropriate way
To commemorate the day?
Than to swim the Loch Ness?
If K-19 is like more than a hundred other Russian submarines, she is now rotting and spewing her contents.
No money can be found for “proper” disposal (as if there could be such a thing as a proper disposal of radioactive crud).  K-19 continues to kill forever.  Brave Captain?  Don’t patronize me!
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Dry cask storage is disgusting! A response to Dianne Feinstein’s letter of this morning (6/27/2011)

I just received the following form letter from Dianne Feinstein.  She endorses dry cask storage as if it’s a solution to the waste problem.  It isn’t!  It just allows the utilities to keep on making more radioactive spent fuel waste.

—————————————-

Dear Mr. Hoffman:

Thank you for writing to share your opposition to the “Nuclear Power 2021 Act.” I appreciate the time you took to write and welcome the opportunity to respond.

The earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, caused a systemic failure at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. I believe we have an obligation to learn lessons from the disaster in Japan in order to ensure that our nuclear plants are as safe as possible. I recently visited both of California’s nuclear power plants in order to learn more about their emergency preparedness, and on March 30, 2011, I held a hearing on U.S. nuclear power safety in the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, which I chair.

After visiting the plants and hearing expert testimony, I believe there are a number of important lessons we can learn from this tragedy. I have called on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to require that nuclear fuel be moved from cooling pools to dry cask storage systems, which would provide increased security and reduce the impact of a catastrophic accident at a nuclear facility. I also asked the NRC to consider seismic and tsunami hazards, emergency preparedness, and other risks facing nuclear power plants in the relicensing process for existing plants. I have attached for your information two of my recent letters to the NRC.

On March 8, 2011, Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) introduced the “Nuclear Power 2021 Act” (S. 512), which would direct the Department of Energy to establish a program to design small modular nuclear reactors (less than 300 megawatts). This legislation is currently awaiting action in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, of which I am not a member.

I appreciate knowing your opposition to S. 512 and will be sure to keep your thoughts in mind should the Senate consider this or similar legislation during the 112th Congress.

Again, thank you for writing. If you have further questions or comments, please contact my office in Washington, D.C. at (202) 224-3841. Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Dianne Feinstein

United States Senator

Further information about my position on issues of concern to California and the Nation are available at my website, Feinstein.senate.gov. You can also receive electronic e-mail updates by subscribing to my e-mail list. Click here to sign up. Feel free to checkout my YouTube Page.

—————————-

DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII, CHAIRMAN
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI, VICE CHAIRMAN
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
TOM HARKIN, IOWA
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS
TIM JOHNSON, SOUTH DAKOTA
MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND
MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY
RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, TEXAS
LAMAR ALEXANDER, TENNESSEE
SUSAN COLLINS, MAINE
LISA MURKOWSKI, ALASKA ~nitfd ~tatfS ~fnatf
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
BEN NELSON, NEBRASKA
MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS
JON TESTER, MONTANA
SHERROD BROWN, OHIO
LINDSEY GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
MARK KIRK, ILLINOIS
DANIEL COATS, INDIANA
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI
JERRY MORAN, KANSAS
JOHN HOEVEN, NORTH DAKOTA
RON JOHNSON, WISCONSIN
CHARLES J. HOUY, STAFF DIRECTOR
BRUCE EVANS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
The Honorable Gregory Jaczko
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Chairman J aczko:
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025
http://appropriations.senate.gov
April 20, 2011
I am writing to request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) begin examining seismic and tsunami hazards, operational issues,
plant security, emergency preparedness, spent fuel storage options and other
elements of a nuclear power plant’s “design basis” within the scope of the
relicensing process.
The current relicensing process is focused entirely on identifying and
managing the detrimental effects of aging plant facilities. The process does
not reevaluate the threat assessment that formed the basis of the plant’s
original design.
I believe that our understanding of many threats – especially seismic
threats, tsunami threats, spent fuel risks, and terrorist threats – has improved
dramatically since most nuclear power plants were originally designed and
licensed thirty or more years ago. Relicensing these facilities offers a unique
opportunity to review the original assessment of potential threats, in order to
ensure that a facility is designed to endure all threats safely.
I appreciate that the NRC continuously reviews threats, and has
required upgrades to address newly understood concerns outside of the
relicensing process. For instance, the Commission issued rules to lower the
risk of hydrogen explosions when this threat was identified in the 1980s.
However, the ongoing assessment process places the burden of proof on the
NRC to demonstrate that a design or operational modification of a fully
licensed facility is necessary. In contrast, the relicensing process would
place the burden of proof on the facility to demonstrate that it is designed to
endure and survive all potential threats.
Recent events demonstrate that thirty year old threat assessments can
be devastatingly inaccurate. In Japan there have been two earthquakes in
four years that exceeded the “design basis” of nuclear plants. In California,
researchers have recently found new faults close to nuclear power plants,
and tsunami experts have learned that submarine landslides can generate
local tsunamis far larger than previously believed. Finally, recent research
has demonstrated the susceptibility of storing radioactive spent fuel in
densely packed pools. These new threats logically should be considered in a
relicensing process, just as they would be in the licensing of a new nuclear
power plant in the United States.
I strongly encourage the NRC to modify its relicensing policies in
order to assure a full reexamination of design basis elements, including
seismic and tsunami hazards, operational issues, plant security, emergency
preparedness, and spent fuel storage options. If you have any questions or
concerns about this request, please do not hesitate to contact me. I look
forward to working with you to ensure that the United States has the world’s
safest nuclear industry.
DF/mbn
Sincerely,
Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and Water
Development

——————————————————

DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII, CHAIRMAN
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI, VICE CHAIRMAN
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
TOM HARKIN, IOWA
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
RICHARD J, DURBIN, ILLINOIS
TIM JOHNSON, SOUTH DAKOTA
MARY L. LANDRIEU, LOUISIANA
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND
FRANK R, LAUTEN BERG, NEW JERSEY
BEN NELSON, NEBRASKA
MARK PRYOR, ARKANSAS
JON TESTER, MONTANA
SHERROD BROWN, OHIO
MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY
RICHARD C, SHELBY, ALABAMA
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, TEXAS
LAMAR ALEXANDER, TENNESSEE
SUSAN COLLINS, MAINE
LISA MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
LINDSEY GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA
MARK KIRK, ILLINOIS
DANIEL COATS, INDIANA
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI
JERRY MORAN, KANSAS
JOHN HOEVEN, NORTH DAKOTA
RON JOHNSON, WISCONSIN
CHARLES J. HOUY, STAFF DIRECTOR
BRUCE EVANS, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
The Honorable Gregory laczko
Chairman
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Chairman 1 aczko:
tlnitrd ~tatrs ~rnatr
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025
http://appropriations.senate.gov
April 8, 2011
I am writing to ask that you seriously consider regulatory policies that would
encourage the movement of nuclear fuel, once sufficiently cool, out of spent fuel pools
and into dry cask storage systems. I am concerned that current Nuclear Regulatory
Commission policies allow excessive re-racking and densification of radioactive fuel
within spent fuel pools. In fact, there are examples in the U.S. where nuclear fuel rods
have been stored in spent fuel pools for decades.
According to “Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage,” a
report published in 2006 by the National Research Council at the request of Congress,
dry cask storage systems have inherent safety advantages over spent fuel pool storage.
The report highlighted three main differences between these two storage options:
1. Less spent fuel is at risk in an accident or attack on a dry storage cask than
on a spent fuel pool. An accident or attack on a dry cask facility would likely
affect only a few casks at a time. An accident or attack on a spent fuel pool places
the entire fuel inventory at risk.

[[[ This is utterly ridiculous. The assumption that “only a few dry casks” would be attacked or damaged is based on NOTHING BUT HOPE. Look at how tight they are packed together at SanO or anywhere else!  THINK what ONE JUMBO JET COULD DO!  The only thing that makes dry cask fuel the least bit safer is that it’s not as “Fresh” out of the “oven” as new fuel! — Ace ]]]


2. The consequences of an accident or terrorist attack on a dry cask storage
facility are lower than those for a spent fuel pool. If an accident or attack on a
dry cask facility resulted in radioactive material being released, the dispersion
could likely be contained easier than if a spent fuel pool were compromised.

[[[ Equally ridiculous since it’s based on (1) above, the assumption that only “a few” casks would be affected. But listen here folks: If you read the detailed description of so-called accident scenarios for dry casks in transit to Yucca Mountain or at any other time, DOE descriptions, only a tiny, tiny fraction of a dry cask’s fuel load is ever released in their accident scenarios!” Senator Feinstein is full of hot are on this one, too. We need to shut the reactors, and that’s that. — Ace ]]]
3. The recovery from an attack on a dry cask would be much easier than the
recovery from an attack on a spent fuel pool. Containing radiation that could
be released from damage to dry casks can be plugged temporarily with radiationabsorbing
materials until permanent fixes are available. Containing radiation from
a compromised spent fuel pool is likely to be much more difficult, particularly if
the overlying building collapsed preventing workers from reaching the pool.
When taken together, these points assert that the risk of a non-recoverable accident
decreases when spent nuclear fuel is kept in smaller, easier to manage, containers that are
distributed intelligently on a secure site. The continuous re-racking and addition of fuel
rods in spent fuel pools appears to be at odds with these safety recommendations. Based
on these findings, I ask the NRC to initiate a rulemaking process to immediately require a
more rapid shift of spent fuel to dry casks.

[[[ Three is irrelevant UNLESS YOU GET RID OF THE SPENT FUEL POOLS TOO (and the reactors). Then sure, it MIGHT be easier to “contain” a dry cask fire by LETTING ONE BURN and HOPING THE NEXT ONE DOESN’T CATCH FIRE.  Then come back later and try to clean up the mess.  It MIGHT “work”. But it might not. And she’s still completely ignoring the fact that the accident she’s postulating as possible, has ALWAYS BEEN POSTULATED AS IMPOSSIBLE. We need to shut the reactors down forever. This is crazy! — Ace ]]]

The lesson from Japan’s disaster is that we must be prepared to respond to
unanticipated threats.

[[[ Not really. The real lesson is that the nuclear industry is UTTERLY UNPREPARED TO RESPOND TO REAL-WORLD EVENTS. And lies their teeth off.  And they put all our lives at grave risk because of these facts.  Those are the real lessons from Fukushima. — Ace ]]]

Therefore, any policy changes that further reduce risks of an
unsafe situation catching the industry off guard should be implemented. I look forward
to working with you further on this issue.
DF/mbn/ac
. Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and Water
Development

 

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An Arab Woman Blues — comments by an American woman in Nevada

Ace, I feel that we all must read the agonized stories from women in Iraq: Children sold, DU causing enormous
amounts of leukemia and ‘tumors’ — how they are hating us, when our men and women who willingly fought
and died for what they thought was a ‘good’ cause. It’s hard to hear their voices. Their hospitals empty of medicine and even sheets, no clean water, on and on. Please take the time to read. I went all the way back to
the beginning of May postings before I cracked. I just started out to read a website, and found this.

http://arabwomanblues.blogspot.com/

 

Ace, I feel that we all must read the agonized stories from women in Iraq: Children sold, DU causing enormous
amounts of leukemia and ‘tumors’ — how they are hating us, when our men and women who willingly fought
and died for what they thought was a ‘good’ cause. It’s hard to hear their voices. Their hospitals empty of medicine and even sheets, no clean water, on and on. Please take the time to read. I went all the way back to
the beginning of May postings before I cracked. I just started out to read a website, and found this.

 

———————————–

Note: I posted a shortened version of these letters on FB…

 

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Boxer abdicates her responsibilities in a big way…

Sender: Toby Hall <2btobyhall/at/gmail.com>
From: Daghda Vision- <toby/at/rosehall.net>
Subject: Barbara Boxer – Ca – Nukes Fwd: Responding to Your Message
Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2011 08:10:00 -0700
Cc: Bill McIntyre <mc/at/ciniweb.com>,
Ace Hoffman <rhoffman/at/animatedsoftware.com>,
Leuren Moret <leurenmoret/at/yahoo.com>,
Gordon Edwards <ccnr/at/web.ca>,
Ruby Kobayashi <ruby/at/fargone.co.uk>
To: Dennis Nester <theroyprocess/at/cox.net>

Barbara Boxer
United States Senator
Please do not respond to this message. If you would like to comment on legislation, please visit my website and use the correspondence form athttps://www.boxer.senate.gov/en/contact/policycomments.cfm.
Begin forwarded message:
From: Cheryl Rose <cheryl/at/cherylrose.com>
Date: 17 June 2011 21:54:29 PDT
To: Daghda Vision- <toby/at/rosehall.net>
Subject: Fwd: Responding to Your Message
Begin forwarded message:
From: “U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer” <senator/at/boxer.senate.gov>
Date: June 17, 2011 5:12:03 PM PDT
Subject: Responding to Your Message
United States Senate
Dear Mrs. Hall:
Thank you for contacting me regarding the safety of our country’s nuclear power plants. As Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee (EPW), which has jurisdiction over domestic nuclear regulatory activities, I appreciate hearing from you on this vitally important issue.
Following the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the subsequent damage and failure of nuclear reactors in that country, I called on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct an immediate, comprehensive review of the safety of all nuclear power plants in the United States. I also convened an EPW hearing to review the Japanese nuclear emergency and its implications for nuclear safety in the United States.
It is critically important to thoroughly examine all plants subject to significant seismic activity or located near a coastline (notably California’s San Onofre and Diablo Canyon plants), the 54 plants that were licensed prior to 1980, and those plants licensed after 1980 that share significant characteristics with the compromised reactors in Japan. That is why I have also asked the NRC to respond to specific questions about plant design and operations, type of reactor, and preparedness to withstand an earthquake or tsunami. I also believe that before there is any license renewal granted in California, all in-depth earthquake and tsunami studies must be completed.
I am pleased to report that the NRC recently issued inspection reports on all 104 U.S. nuclear power reactors and will continue its oversight process to ensure that these facilities are up to code and comply with all public health and safety regulations.
Again, thank you for writing to me. Be assured that I will keep working to protect the health and safety of the American public.
Sincerely,

Barbara Boxer
United States Senator
Please do not respond to this message. If you would like to comment on legislation, please visit my website and use the correspondence form athttps://www.boxer.senate.gov/en/contact/policycomments.cfm.
She was supposed to shut them down…
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